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sity seems at first view to be greater than it really is upon closer
examination. But we are fully satisfied with the construction now
given, and though we entertain very great respect for decisions of
other states, we cannot yield to them an authority any further than
they are sustained in our judgment by sound reason and settled
principles. For the errors in law above indicated in the charge of
the Court below, we reverse the judgment in this case, and remand
the cause for a new trial, on the principles laid down in this opinion.
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Court of Queen'8 Bench, June 18, 1852.
IARDALL V. THELLUSON AND ANOTHER, EXECUTORS OF WILLIAM
THEOBALD, DECEASED.
1. A debt due to the Defendant as Executor, for money had and received after the
death of the Testator, may be set off against a debt due from the Defendant as
Executor, which become due from the Testator before his death.
2. Judgment may be moved for non obstante verdicto on a plea of set-off.

Assumpsit against the executors of William Theobald. The first
three counts were for work and labor, and for money paid in the
lifetime of William Theobald, and upon an account stated with
William Theobald in his lifetime The fourth count was a special
count upon a contract made by William Theobald, to hire the plaintiff as servant. The last count was upon an account stated with
the defendants as executors.
The defendants pleaded (among
other pleas) non assumpserunt to the whole declaration; and to
the first, second, third, and last counts, a set-off of money had and
received for the use of the defendants as executors, and of money
due upon an account stated with the defendants as execbtors. On
the trial, before Lord Campbell, C. J., at the Sittings in Middlesex.
after Hilary Term, 1852, it was contended for the defendants that
there was no evidence to go to the jury to support the contract
stated in the fourth count. The Lord Chief Justice left the evi-
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dence to the jury, who gave a verdict for the plaintiff on that count;
and the set off being proved, he directed a verdict to be entered
for the defendants on the other counts, leave being reserved to move
to enter a verdict for the defendants on the fourth count. In the
following Easter Term, (April 16),
Jumfrey obtained a rule nisi accordingly; and, (April 21),
SS1ee, Serjt., moved for a cross rule for a new trial on the ground
of misdirection, or to enter judgment for the plaintiff, upon the
issue on the plea of set-off, non obstante ver-edicto. [He cited
Hutchinson v. Surges, (Wiles, 264; Shipman v. Thompson, (Id.
103); Scholefield v. Corbett, (6 Nev. & M. 527); BlaIce8ley v.
Smallwood, (8 Q. B. 538; 10 Jur. 470); Houston v. Bobertson,
(4 Camp. 342); and Bogerson v. Ladroke, (1 Bing. 93). Cur.
adv. vult.
On a subsequent day, (April 27,) the Cour) granted a rule
nisi.

In this term, (May 22,) the Court,' after hearing Ogle, who
showed cause against the rule obtained to enter a verdict for the
defendants on the fourth count, and without hearing Channell,
Serjt., and C. . Wood, contra, made the rule absolute.-Bule
absolute to enter verdict for defendants on the fourth count.
Channell, Serjt., and C. W. Wood then showed cause against
the rule obtained on behalf of the plaintiff.-First, in order to
entitle the plaintiff to judgment non obstante veredicto, the plea
must be in confession and avoidance. (Steph. Plead. 107, 5th ed.)
Admitting that it must be considered as if it was the only plea on
the record, a plea of set-off is not in confession and avoidance.
[Iord Campbell, 0. eT.--The plea must be considered as if the
verdict was eptered for the plaintiff on the other counts. The plea
of setroff involves a confession of the plaintiff's cause of action.]
Secondly, the plea is good. The plaintiff sues the defendants as
executors, and they may therefore set off a debt from him to them
in that capacity; and they would be mutual debts, because they
would be assets. (Fortescue, B., in Shipman v. Thompson, Willes
I Lord Campbell, C. J., Coleridge, Erle, and Crompton, JJ.
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103, 106, note (a) ). In an action by an executor to recover
money due to the testator in his lifetime, and received by the defendant after his death, the defendant cannot set off a debt due to him
from the testator. (2 Wins. Exors. 1596, 4th ed. pt. 5, b. 1, c. 1;
note (a) to Hutclinson v. Sturgeg, Willes, 264; Scholefield v. Corbett, 6 1ev. & M. 527). But that rule does not apply to actions
against executors. (Blakesley v. Sm allwood, 8 Q. B. 538; 10
Jur. 470; where the Court did not adhere to the words of stat. 2
Geo. 2, c. 22, s. 13.) If a set-off were allowed in an action by
executors, it would interfere with the distribution of assets; but
that would not be the case in an action against executors.
Ogle, contra.-The plea does not allege that the plaintiff was
indebted to the testator, but to the defendants as executors; whereas the declaration alleges that the testator was indebted to the
plaintiff; therefore the debts are not mutual within sect. 13 of
stat. 2 Geo. 2, c. 22, which gives the right of set-off, "if either
party sue or be sued as executor or admin istrator, where there are,
mutual debts between the testator or intestate and either party."
If the executors had sued in respect of this debt, they might have
declared either as executors or in their own right; and if they had
sued in their own right, the present plaintiff could not have set off
the debt dfe from the testator, partly on the ground of the interference with the distribution of the assets, but mainly on the ground
that the right of set-off depends wholly upon the statute. Cur.
ad,. vult.
LORD CAMPBELL, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court.
Upon a rule for judgment non obstante veredicto, the question is
raised, whether a debt due to the defendants as executors, for money
had and received after the death of the testator, can be set off'
against a debt due from the defendants as executors, having becomedue from the testator before his death.
The stat. 2 Geo. 2, c. 22, gives the right of set-off where there
are mutual debts between the plaintiff and the defendant; and the
debts above mentioned are comprised in these words, they being
mutual and due in the same right between the plaintiff and the
defendant. Although the second clause, authorizing, in the case of'
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a suit by or against an executor, the set-off of a debt due from the
testator, does not' apply, we think that clause was not intended to
restrict the operation of that which preceded. This construction
was adopted in Blake8ley v. jSmallwood, (8 Q. B., 540; 16 Jur.
470),.-and a set-of of a debt from the plaintiff to the testator was
allowed against a count upon an account stated by the executor
ivith the plaintiff. Against this view the plaintiff contended, that
such a se-off had been held llegal in Shipman v. Thompson,
(WilleA, 103), and the cases referred to in note (a) to Hutchinson
v. .Sturges, (Id. 264). But, upon examination, these authorities do
not appear to support the position contended for. In Shipman v.
Thompson, the plaintiff sued for money due to the testator, received
by the defendant after his death, and the defendant attempted to
set off a debt due from the testator before his death; so that the
question appears the same, the parties being reversed. But the
plaintiff in that case sued in his own right, and not as executor;
this he had the option of. doing in respect of money received after
the death; and as he was suing in his own right, a debt due to the
testator was not a mutual debt within either clause of the statute.
In respect of such a debt the executor may sue in either capacity,
and by suing in his own right, and so preventing the set-off, he
prevents a creditor from interfering with the distribution'of assets;
while, on the other hand, if, when sued as executor for a debt due
before the death, he is allowed to elect to treat a debt accruing
after the death as due to him as executor, the same mischief is prevented. A plaintiff, while wrongfully withholding assets equal to
the debt he claims, ofiglkt not to be allowed to take from the asset's
a further amount in payment of that debt, and force the executor
to the risk and waste of another action for the assets so wrongfully
withheld, instead of making a set-off in the first action.-Bule to
enter judgment for plaintiff non obstante verdicto discharged.

